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BOOK REVIEW
THE LAW OF EASEMENTS AND LICENSES IN LAND. By Jon W. Brucet and
James W. Ely, Jr.tt Boston, Massachusetts: Warren, Gorham & La-
mont, 1988. Pp. xix, 457. $84.00
Reviewed by R. H. HelmhoIz*
A distinguished commentator, Professor A.W.B. Simpson, recently
observed that the legal treatise seems to be going the way of the dino-
saur and the dodo bird.' To him, and indeed to other thoughtful ob-
servers,2 the treatise's characteristic form appears to have outlived its
natural span, or at least lost its reason for existence among serious aca-
demic writers. The treatise's focus on a particular and specialized area
of the law and its inevitable concentration on the doctrinal analysis of
appellate cases now appear quite out of date to these observers, some-
thing perhaps worthwhile in a simpler and more complacent era, but
which one can no longer think profitable. In its place, stand other disci-
plines thought to be more useful in understanding how law works: sta-
tistics, economics, philosophy, history, even literary criticism. Rejecting
the seemingly confining and pointless parsing of cases, members of the
academy have come to prefer newer charms and loftier perspectives.
The appearance of The Law of Easements and Licenses in Lands
therefore brings one up short. Devoted to a specialized area of the law,
centered around doctrinal analysis, based on recent American case law,
and written by two academics of reputation and ability, this treatise
flies in the face of these trends in legal scholarship. It may of course be
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a "throwback." Perhaps it is nothing more than one of those counter
examples that can be produced in almost any area of the social sciences,
but which does not seriously challenge the accuracy of the proposition
being advanced. On the other hand, it may also be that the recent ob-
servers are mistaken about the direction of legal scholarship. To make a
judgment, I thought it would be appropriate to compare the reasons
commentators have given for the decline of the treatise writing tradi-
tion with the evidence found in this volume. The results, though neither
profound nor startling, confirm several of Professor Simpson's observa-
tions, but they also suggest that there may yet be life in the tradition.
REASONS ASSIGNED FOR DECLINE OF THE TREATISE
Three basic reasons have been advanced for the declining fortunes
of the specialized legal treatise among academic writers. First, there has
been an explosion in the number of cases reported in this country, and
an accompanying invention of better research tools for dealing with
them: WESTLAW, LEXIS, and the like. The argument concludes that
the mass of case law produced by American courts is now so daunting
that no one can hope to master it. This explosion, together with new
machines that make access to the case law instantly available to practi-
tioners, has rendered the legal treatise less necessary than it once was.
Second, in most areas of the law, and certainly in traditional areas
like the law of easements and licenses, scholars already have dealt with
the material coherently and comprehensively. No one likes merely to
rearrange what others have done. The natural desire for originality has
driven academics, at least academics. at our national law schools, to
prospect farther afield; hence the greater interest in legal theory and in
what lawyers once considered to be marginal disciplines like economics
and history.
Third, the widespread acceptance of the teachings of the Realist
Movement has caused a loss of faith in the worth of studying appellate
decisions. Few believe any longer that the outcome of litigation follows
by a process of formal deduction from the application of legal principles
to the facts of a particular case, and some believe that legal doctrine is
little more than a fig leaf, covering the political and social preferences
of the adjudicators. To the Realists, a legal treatise has come to seem,
and in fact to be, an irrelevance. This Review examines and evaluates
these three reasons.
1. The Mass of American Cases and the Treatise
Although admittedly concerning a relatively small corner of Ameri-
can jurisprudence, the contents of this treatise surely support the pro-
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